Australian AI research, adoption and labour-market evidence,
taken from the reports and datasets themselves, every figure linked to its source
with the date we read it, caveats included.
Answers to the Joint Select Committee on AI: the Productivity Commission’s $116
billion is not a cost-benefit analysis, nobody has modelled AI job losses or offshore
payments, and the workplace department holds no data on whether employers consult
workers before bringing AI in.
What the 139,000 in the Jobs and Skills Report 2026 actually measures, the box that puts
AI outside the baseline projections, and what the report’s own evidence on AI and work
says.
The AI Safety Institute’s CSIRO report on scalable oversight: what its AI-on-AI
experiments tested, the training condition its clear steering result depends on, and what
it means for anyone relying on a human to check an AI.
eSafety's survey of 1,950 children, taken before the Age-Restricted Material Codes for AI
services began: 78 per cent had used an AI assistant and 8 per cent a companion, assistant users
sought personal advice more often than companion users, and one in five who had used either
had a potentially harmful interaction.
The OAIC's triennial attitudes survey puts AI companies equal-last on trust with
data brokers. Ninety-six per cent want conditions before an AI decides anything about
them, demand for accuracy validation and bias testing rose fastest of all, and only
25 per cent accept AI for eligibility decisions.
DEWR's monitoring framework finds exposed occupations growing 5.6 per cent
against 9.5 for the least exposed, says itself the result is not definitive, and
shows the most exposed workers are majority women with degrees.
NAIC and CSIRO's ecosystem census: 25 clusters led by Melbourne CBD, patents
near-quadrupled, research share of global output falling, and a
commercialisation gap the report calls out itself.