The PC told the committee its $116 billion estimate is
not a cost-benefit analysis and it knows of nobody who has done one. It has not
modelled AI job losses or payments to overseas AI providers, and the workplace
department holds no data on whether employers consult staff about AI.
The 139,000 is a modelled gap: fewer Skill Level 1
workers than baseline growth if education choices followed labour demand, offset by
about 106,000 more trade and technical workers. JSA says the scenario does not
consider AI, and the report’s baseline does not explicitly model it.
The Secretaries Digital and Data Committee cites the risk of relying
on a small number of overseas AI providers, in a communique published on
6 November. A week earlier, Home Affairs told a parliamentary committee its
broader posture on open-weight models is still being worked through, and
the AI Safety Institute described red flags.
The DTA released its AI Reference Architecture on 30
October. The companion guide’s first worked example is Copilot, and it tells
agencies an Australian data centre commitment for data at rest does not
necessarily mean Australian processing, that security assessments may not
cover every component, and that Copilot may shape official work without automatically keeping the prompts and outputs.
Microsoft’s own page says queries from outside the EU may be processed in other regions.
The OAIC received 5,268 privacy complaints in
2025–26, up 60 per cent. Its annual report, published on 22 October,
says the rise appears to be attributable to concern about social media, AI companies and
data brokers, citing its attitudes survey. Its sector table has no line for
AI; social media complaints rose 125 per cent.
Version 2.1 of the policy, published on 21 October,
changes no requirement. It adds Appendix D, a classification agencies must
use in registers, impact assessments and transparency statements: seven usage
patterns where there were four, adding coding, workflow automation and strategic
support, and decision-making redefined around rights or interests. The impact assessment
tool still offers the old four boxes.
The Privacy Commissioner says a shop or manufacturer that collects
nothing may have no Privacy Act obligations; the software provider holding
the data is likely the one that answers. Most collection needs no consent.
On 7 October the OAIC announced an investigation into the maker of the HeyCyan
app after it did not answer preliminary inquiries. Tranche 2’s erasure right would
stop at large digital platforms.
Introduced on 15 October and sent to a Senate
committee the same day, with 30 October 2026 set as the closing date for submissions. A service that
generates material using AI is now an online service in its own right, and testing before
deployment appears in the explanatory memorandum, not the Act. Schedule 3 still
repeals every industry code and standard, and nothing requires output
differentiation in their place.
The Joint Select Committee on AI wrote to the Prime Minister on
12 October, before its report. It wants evaluators with employee-like
access inside frontier labs, incident reporting with clear deadlines, early
model access for agencies such as ASD where labs train here, and a register of sovereign AI
companies. The report is due by 30 November.
The AI Safety Institute published the report on 8 October.
An AI can be right on the task it is checked on and still shift what its overseer believes
about something else. The clear result came when an adversary controlled the
verifier’s training; with less control the effect was inconsistent, a
condition the Institute’s summary page leaves out.
ASIC’s 30 September letter to bank boards lists the review
among its new activities for 2026-27. Of the five sector
letters ASIC published that day, it is the only one to give AI its own heading and
an expected start. The markets letter says ASIC will assess and address AI-driven manipulation; the
general insurance letter does not mention AI.
Under rules ASIC made in September, a market participant must not act
on a client’s order it ought reasonably suspect will have the effect
of creating a false or misleading appearance, whether or not anyone intended it. The 2025
consultation paper proposed an intention test only; ASIC added the effect limb afterwards,
citing agentic AI. Draft guidance was put out for comment with a closing date of
5 November 2026.
eSafety surveyed 1,950 children aged 10 to 17 before
the Age-Restricted Material Codes for AI services took effect on 9 March. 78%
had used an AI assistant and 8% an AI companion; among assistant users,
46% had sought personal advice, such as about their health. One in five who
had used either had a potentially inappropriate or harmful interaction.
The DTA points to its agentic AI addendum as the
foundation for Australia’s part in a new OECD working group. It tells agencies to make a
human accountable for agents’ decisions and to keep oversight
human-in-the-loop or human-on-the-loop. It also calls itself best practice
guidance, and the binding AI policy lists the standard it extends under recommended
actions.
Its first meeting, on 26 June, considered two
staff-facing AI uses at the Attorney-General’s Department and Services Australia; the
DTA announced it 103 days later. The DTA will provide the
Minister for Finance with the minutes and the advice issued to agencies, and
the committee will publish communiques. The government’s AI policy, still version 2.0,
does not mention the committee.
The 31 August exposure draft never says artificial
intelligence. Its AI rule is one definition: personal information is
collected however it is obtained, including by generating or
deriving it, which the consultation paper says will make AI inferences count.
Every collection would have to be fair and reasonable, and a sensitive
inference would need consent unless an exception applies. Submissions
closed 18 September; the commencement table is blank.
The 8 September exposure draft repeals every online safety
industry code and standard, including the one that makes high impact generative AI
services test their models and differentiate AI outputs, and the basic
online safety expectations that name generative AI. No provision keeps them in force. In
their place is one general duty, backed by 60,000 penalty units. The
repeals start 12 months after Royal Assent, and as at 6 October the bill had not reached
Parliament.
The NSW Auditor-General counted the governance around AI at the 10
agencies with the highest AI use or greatest potential benefit. All 10 have
addressed accountability and eight train staff, but only
half have an AI policy, four have considered AI in their IT
policies and one in procurement. A new mandatory AI Operational Policy now
requires registration and a signed attestation, the first due 31 October
2027. It says nothing about tracking AI costs.
PSPF Direction 002-2026 was published on 29 September with AI in its
title and frontier AI in its reasoning. What it requires is older than that. Every
non-corporate Commonwealth entity must stocktake its legacy technology and
send Home Affairs a risk management plan with a reduction target by
31 March 2027. Entities running Systems of Government Significance report
on those by 31 December 2026, against measures in an explanatory note that
is not out yet. No AI tool is banned, approved or named.
We read all 116 Australian Government AI transparency statements. On the
one requirement a reader can check in a second, compliance is high and comparability is nil:
at least 18 different wordings, most of them prose rather than a field. Two automated passes
over the same 109 readable documents disagreed by 15, and hand-reading showed both had
undercounted.
We reconciled the DTA’s index of mandatory AI transparency
statements against the Finance register of Commonwealth entities and it balances exactly:
106 non-corporate entities, 95 statements, 11 accounted for. The carve-out is drawn by
portfolio rather than function, so the Department of Veterans’ Affairs is outside a
policy that binds the AFP. Three carved-out bodies published anyway.
Policy Advisory 001-2026 describes a vulnerability storm and exploit
timelines collapsing from days to hours, then answers with patching, hardening and the
Essential Eight. In the attached ASD framework, adopting AI is the fifth of six strategies
and medium-term.
PSPF Policy Advisory 001-2025 confirms OFFICIAL information can be
used with generative AI, and names Hosting Certification Framework providers, OpenAI and
Anthropic as needing no additional Foreign Ownership, Control or Influence assessment.
Every other provider must be assessed under a separate Direction before staff get access.
An allow list you can read, beside a deny list you cannot.
PSPF Direction 001-2025 bans DeepSeek products, applications and web
services from government systems, and a footnote excludes open sourced LLMs on three
cumulative conditions: inspectable codebase, local deployment, mitigations in place. Since
Direction 004-2025 took effect on 31 October 2025 the operative list has been the
Commonwealth Technology Standard Deny List, which is not in the PSPF publications library.
The Senate select committee tabled its final report on 26 November 2024,
recommending dedicated legislation for high-risk AI, work health and safety coverage, and
transparency about copyrighted works in training data. Senate practice requires a response in
three months. It was tabled in the House on 1 April 2026, in five thematic parts that refer to
a numbered recommendation three times. The Senate’s own pages still do not record it.
The Policy for the responsible use of AI in government applies to all
non-corporate Commonwealth entities and carries eight mandatory requirements. So does the
Protective Security Policy Framework, whose Directions ban a named AI service outright. The
APS AI Plan, the technical standard, the agentic addendum and the PSPF policy advisories are
guidance. Corrected 29 August on a reader tip.
Eight mandatory requirements, read from the policy document rather
than the summary of it. A scope test that excludes AI spellcheckers, a named human
answerable for every in-scope use case, a register that goes to the DTA twice a year, and an
impact assessment that must be finished before deployment. One deadline has passed, a
cluster lands at the end of 2026, and everything already running is due by 30 April 2027.
The ACCC, ACMA, eSafety and the OAIC published 2026-28 priorities and a signed MoU two days apart in June. We read both plus all 2,332 words of the signed document. AI appears zero times, from a forum whose last three substantive publications were about AI.
The APS AI Plan published 15 deliverables against dated timeframes, and most of those dates have now passed. The oversight committee arrived, chaired by the DTA chief executive and seating the Privacy Commissioner and the head of the AI Safety Institute. Its own page says the advice is non-binding and that it does not replace agency accountability.
The obligation commences 10 December 2026 under the Privacy Act. Three limbs, and the one that decides scope is whether a decision could reasonably be expected to significantly affect a person’s rights or interests. The OAIC consulted on exactly that, closed submissions on 15 June, and the guidance is not out.
119 pages by Gradient Institute on what happens when AI agents from
different organisations meet. Three governance tiers, a map of who can act on each risk,
and a set of gaps that fall to no one: there is no trusted issuer for agent identity, and
the report says no single party has the standing or the funding model to become one.
The memorandum with Singapore was signed on 16 December 2024, a year
before the Canada and UK ones, and its text is published. We read it: no binding
obligations, each side bears its own costs, and every mechanism it creates is permissive.
The first dialogue it has produced met on 30 July, and its own review window opens on
16 December 2026.
We read both Directions to Comply on the eSafety register. Each names
the provider a high impact generative AI DIS with a tier 1 risk profile, each cites the same
two compliance measures, and the first of those reaches the moment before the material
exists: what a service will let a user ask it to generate.
Signed 25 May 2026. What is public is a three-bullet overview, where
the Canada agreement eleven weeks earlier was published in full, clauses and all. Because we
read that one, we can say precisely what this overview does not answer: whether it binds
anyone, whether it funds anything, and what may actually be shared.
The full text is published, so we read it. Seven areas of cooperation
including talent exchange between the two AI safety institutes, and two hard deadlines. It
creates no legally binding obligations, has no financial implication for either country, and
ends on six months' notice. The workplan is due around 1 September.
The ACITI Partnership was announced in November 2025 in a joint statement
that led with green energy innovation, resilient supply chains and critical minerals, and said
the partnership would also examine artificial intelligence. The memorandum, whose signing
was announced in July 2026, sets up a joint working group with four streams, and every one of them is AI.
Minerals, energy and net zero do not appear in it at all.
It is eight months old, it sits inside the department whose policy it
informs, and its technical partners include the Australian Signals Directorate, which the
ministerial release did not mention. The multi-agent project credited to it was published four
months before it existed and funded by the department. And the international network it belongs
to has quietly dropped the words “AI Safety” from its name.
Six ministers jointly named the government’s AI safety priorities on
20 July: a Digital Duty of Care, a second tranche of privacy reform, workplace AI safety,
consumer-law options covering agentic commerce and surveillance pricing, and a framework for
automated decision-making inside federal agencies. Four lead ministers share them, the release
gave none a date, and two have since reached draft bills.
Updated OAIC guidance implements what the Administrative Review Tribunal
decided in the Bunnings matter, covering 62 stores between 2018 and 2021. It clarifies when the
consent exceptions apply to biometric collection in retail, restates that a precautionary
approach is required, and cites a survey finding that 45 per cent of Australians now rate
facial recognition among the biggest privacy risks they face. The Kmart matter is still live.
The privacy regulator's triennial national survey puts AI
companies equal-last on trust, level with data brokers. Ninety-six per cent want
conditions before an AI decides anything about them, and of the eight conditions
measured in both 2023 and 2026, every one rose. We read the 80-page report and set
it against the regulatory posture Australia actually chose.
In 2024 the government proposed ten mandatory guardrails for
high-risk AI and three ways to make them law, up to an Australian AI Act. The plan
that answered commits to none of it; the word "guardrails" does not appear once in
its 37 pages. We read both documents end to end, and here is what actually binds
an Australian AI deployer today.
Zero mentions of artificial intelligence, machine learning or generative in the whole
Act. The category that catches AI services is defined by what it is not, and the reason
turns on a question worth asking about your own product: who is the other end-user?
The Attorney-General has announced the government is not considering a text and data
mining exception. That settles the question most of the argument has been about, and it
makes the three areas actually on the table worth reading.
The words ASIC attributes to the court do not appear in its judgment. What does is a
five-factor test for what counts as adequate, and an express statement that the law
does not demand perfection.
Schedule 6 of the Age-Restricted Material codes names AI companion chatbots, deems
some generative services highest-risk without an assessment, and regulates platforms
that host uploaded models.
Its sibling instrument covers messaging and email, and does not contain the word
once. What it says about AI instead, and the qualification that matters.
A binding standard defines a “high impact generative AI DIS” and tells
its provider what to do, including differentiate AI outputs. Read clause by clause.