We read the bill as introduced on 16 October and said the committee had a concrete question to settle: whether the section 27 risk assessment should name model testing and output differentiation for generative AI services, and which instrument, if any, the validation clause was written for. The 135-page report, published on its reporting date, answers neither. It also tells us something we had not reported: the House of Representatives agreed to the bill on 28 October 2026, with 15 Government amendments and eight crossbench amendments.

The four recommendations

These are the committee’s recommendations in full, as the report numbers them (paragraphs 3.88 to 3.91). The committee is chaired by Senator Varun Ghosh.A

  1. Recommendation 1. The committee recommends that the Australian Government introduce amendments to the bill to establish a civil right of action for individuals in respect of breaches of the Digital Duty of Care that cause harm or loss.
  2. Recommendation 2. The committee recommends that the Australian Government, as part of the statutory review, consider the effectiveness of the Digital Duty of Care in addressing online hate and vilification directed at individuals or groups on the basis of protected characteristics.
  3. Recommendation 3. The committee recommends that the Australian Government amend the bill to clarify the scope of application, specifically to confirm:
    • the bill’s intention to regulate digital communication platforms, such as social media platforms; and
    • that the bill is not intended to apply to low-risk websites or online services, such as small business websites, online market places, booking platforms, or religious websites focused on education or doctrinal instruction.
  4. Recommendation 4. Subject to consideration of Recommendations 1 and 3, the committee recommends that the Senate pass the bill.

Exhibit A · from the source

Page 83 of the committee report: Recommendations 1 to 4, a civil right of action, a review on online hate, a clarified scope, and that the Senate pass the bill.
The committee’s recommendations, page 83 of the report (PDF page 93 of 135), read 20 November 2026. Outlined: the right of action, the scope clarification, and the recommendation to pass. None mentions AI. Open the PDF Back to the story

What it says about AI services

The committee view, paragraphs 3.78 to 3.87, does not use the words artificial intelligence, AI or chatbot. Nor does any recommendation. Section 25B(1)(h), which since introduction makes a service that generates material using artificial intelligence and that uses an internet carriage service in the course of doing so an online service in its own right, is not discussed in the committee’s reasoning.

AI does appear in the evidence the report summarises, mostly as a question of scope:

  • Dr Honni van Rijswijk praised the bill’s reach across the technology stack, including artificial intelligence generation services (paragraph 2.40).
  • DIGI argued that The duty reaches almost every business online, listing hosting, search, app stores, AI services and equipment suppliers, and asked for clarity on business systems such as enterprise AI tools, which have a very different risk profile (2.41 and 2.42).
  • Dr van Rijswijk also proposed adding manipulative artificial intelligence companions to the harms children are protected from (2.70).
  • The eSafety Commissioner’s General Counsel, Richard Fleming, told the committee that among the criteria eSafety is considering for the lowest risk platforms is where there are no AI chatbots (2.142).
  • On apps that generate fake nude material, the department said the duty itself would require services to take appropriate and effective action to prevent the generation or distribution of fake nude material created without the consent of the person depicted (3.14).

None of this is taken up in the committee view. The report records no evidence on testing a model before release or on marking AI output. The word testing appears, but about testing the features of a service and the Commissioner’s covert testing accounts, not models; we found no use of watermarking or provenance at all.

The codes and the validation clause

The majority treats leaving the codes behind as the point of the bill. In its view, Rather than relying primarily on sector-specific industry codes and standards, the proposed framework would impose a systemic duty on online service providers, and the bill would move the regulatory approach away from an over-reliance on industry codes and towards a framework in which online service providers have clear obligations to prevent harm. It does not discuss what becomes of specific obligations in the codes and standards when Schedule 3 repeals them, which the report notes will coincide with the repeal of the Basic Online Safety Expectations, and industry codes and standards, 12 months after Royal Assent (paragraph 1.72).

The report does record a way to carry them over. The eSafety Commissioner submitted that the Bill could prescribe specific minimum obligations to comply with the digital duty of care under disallowable legislative instrument. Requirements in legislative instrument could draw on the obligations in the Online Safety Codes and Standards in a streamlined and simplified manner. (2.24). No recommendation adopts it.

The validation clause, Schedule 1 items 90 and 91, which would treat registered codes and standards as never affected by a comment period shorter than the Act requires, is not mentioned anywhere in the report.

Where the Coalition and the Greens part company

The Coalition dissent, signed by Senators Sarah Henderson and Dean Smith, calls the bill so deeply flawed and so ill-conceived that it should never have seen the light of day, and a blank cheque for political censorship. It is the only part of the report to make the codes an objection, and the only part that ties them to AI chatbots. It notes that the codes and standards include safeguards against harmful content generated by AI chatbots, and says: Shockingly, after a 12-month transition period, the bill abolishes all 17 codes and standards in favour of a broadly defined Digital Duty of Care, with no guarantee that the existing protections will be replicated. It quotes eSafety’s submission: As currently drafted, the Bill does not provide any mechanism to set specific obligations. While eSafety will provide regulatory guidance that outlines what it sees as best practice, this guidance is not enforceable. Its single recommendation: That the Online Safety Amendment (Digital Duty of Care) Bill 2026 not be passed.

The Australian Greens’ additional comments, from the deputy chair, Senator Sarah Hanson-Young, back a duty but say these laws must have the teeth and enforcement that will actually change industry behaviour. Their six recommendations are a private right of action with compensation, fines for breaching the duty set at 10 per cent of a company’s global revenue, an external dispute resolution system for social media platforms, addictive design in risk assessments, wagering listed as a harm to children with age assurance at entry, and stronger data access for researchers. They do not mention AI or the codes.

The three positions in the report, on the points that matter to AI providers
PointCommittee majorityCoalition dissentGreens comments
Pass the bill?Yes, subject to considering Recommendations 1 and 3NoAmend it; no recommendation on passing it
Right to sueCivil right of action (Rec 1)Not recommendedPrivate right of action with compensation
AI servicesNot mentioned in the view or recommendationsNotes AI chatbot safeguards in the codesNot mentioned
Repeal of the 17 codes and standardsWelcomes the move away from codesOpposes itNot mentioned
Validation clauseNot mentionedNot mentionedNot mentioned

What changed in the House

The report says the Government amendments were intended to make technical corrections and changes and provide additional clarity for provisions that exclude material from the scope of harms captured by the digital duty of care, and the crossbench amendments changed the definition of material harmful to children (section 25E) and the user empowerment tools provisions. It describes no change to the AI paragraph, the repeal or the validation clause. We have not yet read the amendments themselves.

What happens next

  • 28 October 2026: the House of Representatives agreed to the bill with amendments.
  • 20 November 2026: the committee reported.
  • Next: the bill returns to the Senate, where the government can move amendments in response to Recommendations 1 and 3.
  • The day after Royal Assent: Schedule 1 starts, including the higher code penalties, the validation clause and the take-down notices for fake nude material.
  • 12 months after Royal Assent: the duty starts, and the codes, standards and expectations are repealed.

Our view

The committee answered the questions most of its witnesses asked, about speech, small business and redress, and a right to sue is a real addition. It did not answer the one that matters most for AI services. Under the designated internet services standard, a high impact generative AI service must test its models and differentiate their outputs; under the bill, that becomes something the explanatory memorandum says a provider may do. The report records eSafety’s own suggestion for keeping specific obligations, minimum requirements in a disallowable instrument drawing on the codes, and then passes over it. That instrument is the obvious place for model testing to live, and the government can still propose it.

Recommendation 3 needs care for the same reason. A scope clause that confirms the bill is aimed at digital communication platforms, such as social media platforms and lists what is out says nothing, on its face, about where a standalone chatbot sits. The regulator’s own counsel treats AI chatbots as a sign that a service is not lowest risk. Whatever amendment the government drafts should say plainly that section 25B(1)(h) stays in. And the validation clause has now been through the House and a Senate inquiry, and neither the explanatory memorandum nor this report says which instrument it was written for.

Sources

Method note. Written substantially by AI and run by people, working from the 5 primary sources below. How AI Geek works.

  1. Online Safety Amendment (Digital Duty of Care) Bill 2026, report, Senate Environment and Communications Legislation Committee, November 2026, 135 pages (PDF, read 20 November 2026): paragraphs 1.1, 1.20 to 1.22, 1.71 and 1.72; 2.24, 2.40 to 2.42, 2.70, 2.142; 3.14; the committee view and Recommendations 1 to 4 (3.78 to 3.91); the Coalition Senators’ Dissenting Report (1.1, 1.3, 1.28, 1.71, 1.72, 1.135); the Australian Greens’ Additional Comments (1.6, 1.26 to 1.31). Shown in Exhibit A.
  2. Report contents page, Parliament of Australia (read 20 November 2026): REPORT - November 2026, chapters 1 to 3, committee view, dissenting report and additional comments.
  3. Online Safety Amendment (Digital Duty of Care) Bill 2026, first reading, Parliament of Australia, 90 pages (read 16 October 2026): s 25B(1)(h); Sch 1 Part 5 items 90 and 91; Sch 3.
  4. Online Safety (Designated Internet Services, Class 1A and Class 1B Material) Industry Standard 2024, eSafety Commissioner (PDF, read in full 4 August 2026, section 22(3) re-read 16 October 2026): the model testing and output differentiation requirements for a high impact generative AI DIS.
  5. Explanatory memorandum, Parliament of Australia, 105 pages (read 16 October 2026): the generative AI controls example under section 27, which a provider may use.

How we checked this. The report was downloaded from ParlInfo on the afternoon of 20 November and read through its committee view, both minority documents and the evidence chapters on scope, harms, risk assessment, fake nude material and researcher access. We searched the full text for artificial intelligence, AI, chatbot, generative, model, testing, watermark, provenance, label and valid; the findings above about what the report does not say rest on that search. Every quotation is verbatim from the report; the report itself quotes some witnesses from the proof Hansard, which can change before the official record. The may in our view is from the explanatory memorandum we read on 16 October. We have not yet read the House amendments, and we have not asked the committee, the department or eSafety about the validation clause or the model duties. The “our view” section is opinion based on the documents cited.

Read the report differently? Tell us and we will check it against the document and log the outcome here.